WikiLeaks - Intelligence

CIA Travel Advice To Operatives

Today, 21 December 2014, WikiLeaks releases two classified documents by a previously undisclosed CIA office detailing how to maintain cover while ​travelling through airports using false ID – including during operations to infiltrate the European Union and the Schengen passport control system. This is the ​second release within WikiLeaks' CIA Series, which will continue in the new year.


The two classified documents aim to assist CIA undercover officials to circumvent these systems around the world. They detail border-crossing and visa ​regulations, the scope and content of electronic systems, border guard protocols and procedures for secondary screenings. The documents show that the ​CIA has developed an extreme concern over how biometric databases will put CIA clandestine operations at risk – databases other parts of the US ​government made prevalent post-9/11.





How to Survive Secondary Screening without Blowing your CIA Cover


The CIA manual "Surviving Secondary", dated 21 September 2011, details what happens in an airport secondary screening in different airports around the ​world and how to pass as a CIA undercover operative while preserving one's cover. Among the reasons for why secondary screening would occur are: if the ​traveller is on a watchlist (noting that watchlists can often contain details of intelligence officials); or is found with contraband; or "because the inspector ​suspects that something about the traveler is not right".


The highlighted box titled "The Importance of Maintaining Cover––No Matter What" at the end of the document provides an example of an occasion when a ​CIA officer was selected for secondary screening at an EU airport. During the screening his baggage was swiped and traces of explosives found. The officer ​"gave the cover story" to explain the explosives; that he had been in counterterrorism training in Washington, DC. Although he was eventually allowed to ​continue, this example begs the question: if the training that supposedly explained the explosives was only a cover story, what was a CIA officer really doing ​passing through an EU airport with traces of explosives on him, and why was he allowed to continue?


The CIA identifies secondary screening as a threat in maintaining cover due to the breadth and depth of the searches, including detailed questioning, ​searches of personal belongings and electronic databases and collection of biometrics "all of which focus significant scrutiny on an operational traveler".


The manual provides advice on how best to prepare for and pass such a process: having a "consistent, well-rehearsed, and plausible cover". It also explains ​the benefits of preparing an online persona (for example, Linked-In and Twitter) that aligns with the cover identity, and the importance of carrying no ​electronic devices with accounts that are not for the cover identity, as well as being mentally prepared.




CIA Overview of EU Schengen Border Control


The second document in this release, "Schengen Overview", is dated January 2012 and details guidelines for border officials in the EU's Schengen zone and ​the threats their procedures might pose in exposing the "alias identities of tradecraft-conscious operational travelers", the CIA terminology for US spies ​travelling with false ID during a clandestine operation. It outlines how various electronic systems within Schengen work and the risks they pose to clandestine ​US operatives, including the Schengen Information System (SIS), the European fingerprint database EURODAC (European Dactyloscopie) and FRONTEX ​(Frontières extérieures) – the EU agency responsible for easing travel between member states while maintaining security.


While Schengen currently does not use a biometric system for people travelling with US documents, if it did this "would increase the identity threat level" ​and, the report warns, this is likely to come into place in 2015 with the EU's Entry/Exit System (EES). Currently, the Visa Information System (VIS), operated by ​a number of Schengen states in certain foreign consular posts, provides the most concern to the CIA as it includes an electronic fingerprint database that ​aims to expose travellers who are attempting to use multiple and false identities. As use of the VIS system grows it will increase the "identity threat for non-​US-documented travelers", which would narrow the possible false national identities the CIA could issue for undercover operatives.


WikiLeaks' Editor-in-Chief Julian Assange said: "The CIA has carried out kidnappings from European Union states, including Italy and Sweden, during the Bush ​administration. These manuals show that under the Obama administration the CIA is still intent on infiltrating European Union borders and conducting ​clandestine operations in EU member states."


Both documents are classified and marked NOFORN (preventing allied intelligence liaison officers from reading it). The document detailing advice on ​maintaining cover through secondary screening also carries the classification ORCON (originator controlled) and specifically allows distribution to Executive ​Branch Departments/Agencies of the US government with the appropriate clearance, facilitating clandestine operations by the other 16 known US ​government spy agencies. Both documents were produced by a previously unknown office of the CIA: CHECKPOINT, situated in the Identity Intelligence ​Center (i2c) within the Directorate of Science and Technology. CHECKPOINT specifically focuses on "providing tailored identity and travel intelligence" ​including by creating documents such as those published today designed specifically to advise CIA personnel on protecting their identities while travelling ​undercover.