WikiLeaks - Intelligence
Target Tokyo
Press Release
Today, Friday 31 July 2015, 9am CEST, WikiLeaks publishes "Target Tokyo", 35 Top Secret NSA targets in Japan including the Japanese cabinet and Japanese companies such as Mitsubishi, together with intercepts relating to US-Japan relations, trade negotiations and sensitive climate change strategy.
The list indicates that NSA spying on Japanese conglomerates, government officials, ministries and senior advisers extends back at least as far as the first administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which lasted from September 2006 until September 2007. The telephone interception target list includes the switchboard for the Japanese Cabinet Office; the executive secretary to the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga; a line described as "Government VIP Line"; numerous officials within the Japanese Central Bank, including Governor Haruhiko Kuroda; the home phone number of at least one Central Bank official; numerous numbers within the Japanese Finance Ministry; the Japanese Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry Yoichi Miyazawa; the Natural Gas Division of Mitsubishi; and the Petroleum Division of Mitsui.
Today's publication also contains NSA reports from intercepts of senior Japanese government officials. Four of the reports are classified TOP SECRET. One of the reports is marked "REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL", meaning it has been formally authorised to be released to the United States' "Five Eyes" intelligence partners: Australia, Canada, Great Britain and New Zealand.
The reports demonstrate the depth of US surveillance of the Japanese government, indicating that intelligence was gathered and processed from numerous Japanese government ministries and offices. The documents demonstrate intimate knowledge of internal Japanese deliberations on such issues as: agricultural imports and trade disputes; negotiating positions in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization; Japanese technical development plans, climate change policy, nuclear and energy policy and carbon emissions schemes; correspondence with international bodies such as the International Energy Agency (IEA); strategy planning and draft talking points memoranda concerning the management of diplomatic relations with the United States and the European Union; and the content of a confidential Prime Ministerial briefing that took place at Shinzo Abe's official residence.
Julian Assange, WikiLeaks Editor-in-Chief, said: "In these documents we see the Japanese government worrying in private about how much or how little to tell the United States, in order to prevent undermining of its climate change proposal or its diplomatic relationship. And yet we now know that the United States heard everything and read everything, and was passing around the deliberations of Japanese leadership to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. The lesson for Japan is this: do not expect a global surveillance superpower to act with honour or respect. There is only one rule: there are no rules."
WikiLeaks Investigations Editor Sarah Harrison said: "Today's publication shows us that the US government targeted sensitive Japanese industry and climate change policy. Would the effectiveness of Japan's industry and climate change proposals be different today if its communications had been protected?"
Japan has been a close historical ally of the United States since the end of World War II. During a recent Presidential visit to Japan, US President Barack Obama described the East Asian country as "one of America’s closest allies in the world". Today's publication adds to previous WikiLeaks publications showing systematic mass spying conducted by US intelligence against the US-allied governments of Brazil "Bugging Brazil", France "Espionnage Élysée" and Germany "The Euro Intercepts"; "All the Chancellor's Men".
Read the full list of NSA high priority targets for Japan published today here.
WikiLeaks' journalism is entirely supported by the general public.
NSA high priority targets for Japan - Top Japanese NSA Intercepts
This is an NSA database extract of significant Japanese political and economic telephone interception targets.
See here for an explanation of what the column names mean.
Glossary
TOPI "Target Office of Primary Interest", the unit within NSA tasked to process the collected interceptions.
Selector A communications identifier, in this case a phone number, used to select communications for interception.
Subscriber_ID This is an identifier describing the owner of the provided phone number.
Information_Need "Information Needs" (IN) are collection requirements devised as part of the National SIGINT Requirement Process and generally produced by analysts in a broad format (e.g. understanding French economic intentions) and used to produce responses to demands of U.S. policy makers. INs rarely expire, so despite having the original creation date included in the identifier (e.g. "2002-388*"), they are renewed and they perpetuate over the time.
TOPI_Add_Date Date of tagging of the entry with the responsible TOPI.
Priority Collection priority, the lower the number, the higher the priority.
IN_Explainer This is a brief and generally broad description of the relevant IN.
Selected extracts of "top" NSA intercepts of Japanese leadership and chief officials, taken from various editions of the National Security Agency's Top Secret Global SIGINT Highlights executive briefings.
- US Intercepts Abe's Secret Plan on Carbon Emissions
- US Bugged Japan's Confidential G-8 Proposals on Climate Change
- US Spies as Japan Doubles Down on Carbon Emissions
- US Spied On Japan's Secret WTO Plan
- US Sets NSA on Japan over Cherry Feud
US Intercepts Abe's Secret Plan on Carbon Emissions
Date 2007
Classification SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
WikiLeaks Synopsis
Intercepted communication reveals the intention of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to announce a measure to reduce carbon emissions by half by 2050 as part of what the Japanese called the "Abe initiative". Additionally, the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not intend to inform the U.S. government about such measure in advance, concerned that given previous reactions by the U.S. on climate change issues, it might oppose such initiative.
Japanese to State Goal of Reducing Carbon Emissions by Half by 2050 (S//SI//NF)
(S//NF) In preparing for the 26 to 27 April visit to Washington by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) apparently wanted to come up with a simple message regarding climate change with which the U.S. can agree. Accordingly, METI has pushed three principles: technical development, energy conservation and nuclear energy, and participation of all countries in the future framework. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) apparently wants Abe to mention at the bilateral summit Japan's goal of reducing carbon emissions by half by 2050 as part of the "Abe initiative," which will be announced in late May. The MFA was considering not informing the U.S. in advance of its intention, because the ministry did not expect Washington to approve of such a goal, based on the U.S. reaction to climate change issues so far. It was apparently decided at a briefing at the Prime Minister's official residence that Abe will clearly state the goal at the bilateral summit, with advance notification to the United States. Japan anticipates no major harm to the Japanese-U.S. relationship as a result.
Unconventional
Japanese leadership
Z-3/OO/8432-07, 181733Z
US Bugged Japan's Confidential G-8 Proposals on Climate Change
Date 2008
Classification TOP SECRET//COMIT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
WikiLeaks Synopsis
Intercepted communication reveals that Japanese Ministries of Economy, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and of Environment briefed Chief Cabiner Secretary Nobutaka Machimura on a set of objectives regarding climage change to address in time for the G-8 summit, believing they would picture Japan as a leader on environmental issues.
Japanese Leadership Working to Narrow Down Climate Change Goals for G-8 Summit (TS//SI)
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Japanese officials from the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Environment briefed Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura on 20 February on the environmental goals they believe Japan should work toward achieving at the G-8 Summit at Lake Toya, Japan, in July. Obtaining an agreement to use a sector-based cumulative approach for medium-term emissions reduction targets for individual countries was mentioned as one of the key objectives. Japan is also seeking to demonstrate its leadership in the environmental sector at the Summit and may announce its domestic emissions reduction goals prior to the meeting.
Unconventional
International commercial
3/OO/1447-08, 252149Z
US Spies as Japan Doubles Down on Carbon Emissions
Date 2008
Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
WikiLeaks Synopsis
Intercepted communication reveals Japan's intent to push the "sectoral approach" as a solution to reduce carbon emissions, despite concerns and criticism from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and European Union officials.
Tokyo's Climate Change Officials to Continue Promoting Sectoral Approach (TS//SI//NF)
(TS//SI//NF) Japanese climate change officials apparently plan to continue promoting the sectoral approach despite criticism from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and some European Union officials. Fatih Birol, Chief Economist of the IEA, reportedly warned the Japanese in mid-May that they are pushing too hard to promote the sectoral approach and may be perceived as offering this approach as the only option for reducing carbon emissions. He also cautioned that the sectoral approach is not yet understood and that Tokyo must clarify the concept and promote understanding and trust among the nations concerned. Masakazu Toyoda of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry expressed frustration at this criticism then laid out three advantages of the sectoral approach: first, the approach is designed to get China, India, and the U.S. on board; second, this approach allows developed countries to avoid expending unnecessary efforts to reduce carbon emissions in areas covered by the sectoral approach; and third, the sectoral approach will, in Toyoda's estimation, not result in any economic or industrial loss for developed or developing nations. One Japanese official thinks that it may be difficult for the Europeans to implement the sectoral approach in sectors such as electricity, which is already subject to the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). He suggested that the ultimate solution is dependent upon the EU accepting a method of determining a figure for total carbon emissions reductions that includes the electricity sector. Toyoda claimed that businesses from several sectors--including steel, aluminum, cement, and petroleum--are threatening to cease their European operations if the ETS continues as is.
Unconventional
Japanese leadership
Z-3/OO/4448-08, 041359Z
US Spied On Japan's Secret WTO Plan
Date 2009
Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
WikiLeaks Synopsis
Intercepted communication reveals drafted talking points for Japanese Ministry Shigeru Ishiba to address issues related to World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Such talking points would cover food import, "fisheries subsidaries", and "tariffs on forestry and fishery products".
Japanese Agriculture Minister to Address WTO Issues With USTR on Margins of OECD Talks (TS//SI//NF)
(TS//SI//NF) The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries drafted talking points on 20 June for Minister Shigeru Ishiba's use at a meeting to address issues related to the Doha Round with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), which is to take place in Paris on the margins of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) trade ministerial. (According to press, Ishiba said that he will visit Paris for 4 days, beginning tomorrow, where he will explain Tokyo's position as a major food importer, referring to the stance it takes in the Doha round of multilateral trade-liberalization talks. During his visit, Ishiba plans to hold separate talks with WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy and the USTR.) Among the points that may be addressed with the USTR are U.S. commitment to concluding the Doha Round negotiations by mid-2010. Regarding the implementation of outcome testing, Ishiba may ask how the USTR will counter developing countries' opposition to holding consultations on special products. The Minister could also address the need to ensure that the results of the WTO agriculture negotiations do not curtail agriculture in the member countries, and Japan's anticipation of an early appointment by the USTR of a chief agricultural negotiator. Other topics that may be broached are fisheries subsidies, the need for bilateral consultations on individual products, and tariffs on forestry and fishery products.
Unidentified
Japanese leadership
Z-3/OO/515664-09, 221902Z
US Sets NSA on Japan over Cherry Feud
Date 2009
Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
WikiLeaks Synopsis
Intercepted communication reveals concern of officials from the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) after Japan delay on the importation of cherries of U.S. origin. Afraid of potential damage as a result of such delay, the officials are intercepted discussing the possibility to diplomatically resolve the tension through back channels.
Japanese Strive to Avoid Damage to U.S. Relations Over Cherry Imports (TS//SI//OC/NF)
(TS//SI//OC/NF) Officials in the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) appeared recently to be seeking ways to prevent damage to relations with the U.S. over the ministry's decision to delay the importation of U.S.-origin cherries, a decision driven by Japanese politicians and growers. MAFF was alarmed by the very strong reaction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to Tokyo's ruling that imports could not commence until the end of this month, when a pilot program involving inspections in the U.S. Pacific Northwest by a MAFF inspector is expected to be concluded satisfactorily. One approach under consideration is to have the ministry admit to Washington, through back channels, that the decision had been the product of political pressure. Also, it was recommended that the U.S. be notified that--unlike in the beef dispute--imports could begin as soon as the result of on-site inspection is confirmed, rather than after the inspector had returned to Japan and more tests conducted. The principal fear among the Japanese is that the issue will become similarly politicized, possibly at senior levels, in Washington.
Unconventional
Japanese governmental
Z-3/OO/515570-09, 221708Z